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EUROPEAN PEACE ISSUES DEMAND EARLY MEETING OF BIG THREE

WHILE the forty-nine nations are drawing up a charter at San Francisco for a world security organization, the Big Three, on whose continued unity the effectiveness of this organization depends, are at odds on almost all immediate political problems in Europe. That Russia, Britain and the United States should find cooperation more difficult following the defeat of the common enemy is not surprising, but the apparent seriousness of the growing rift among those who have just won the war is as unexpected as it is disconcerting. During the war, observers frequently and complacently predicted that no peace conference similar to that held in Paris during the winter of 1918-19 would conclude World War II. But at Yalta it was agreed that such a peace conference should be held at the end of the war lest piecemeal and unilateral settlements in Europe endanger the all-important harmony among the Big Three. And now it seems that this meeting—to which a new Big Three parley, such as Prime Minister Churchill and President Truman have suggested, is a necessary preliminary—must be held soon. For if a peace conference does not take place in the near future, the map of Europe may be largely redrawn by unilateral actions rather than agreements among the victors, and irreparable harm will almost certainly be done to the mutual confidence the great powers built up during the war.

EUROPE DIVIDED. From the growing list of European areas in which disagreements between Russia and the Western Allies have become acute, it is clear that the subject of controversy among the Big Three is no longer whether Europe shall be divided into a Russian zone and a Western sphere, with a partitioned Germany in between. An effort to prevent such a division of the continent was made at the Crimea Conference last February, when President Roosevelt succeeded in securing the adoption of a

plan for tripartite instead of unilateral intervention by the great powers in liberated or former Axis satellite nations. But in the three months since Yalta this formula has not once been implemented. Instead, Russia has been maintaining eastern Europe as a closed preserve by excluding British and American officials and correspondents from areas occupied by the Red Army, and by ignoring protests or inquiries from Washington and London concerning Moscow's policy in the area. Britain, for its part, has continued to control affairs in Greece and encouraged the royalists, with whom London apparently believes it can make satisfactory strategic arrangements in the eastern Mediterranean. With the division of the continent an already existing fact, it appears that the current issue between Russia and the Western Allies is where and how the boundary between the two European zones will be drawn.

"From Stettin to Trieste" has become a popularly accepted dividing line between the Russian sphere and western Europe. But events of the past few weeks indicate that this demarcation may not be acceptable to the British and United States governments, particularly if it is established by unilateral Russian action. On April 30 the State Department and the Foreign Office declared that they did not recognize the provisional government of Austria, which the Soviet Union had announced the previous day. Since the new cabinet in Vienna is a coalition of all three democratic Austrian parties, it is obviously not the composition of the government that has prevented the Western powers from recognizing the régime. Instead, it is the manner in which Russia established the government of a country to be occupied by British, United States and French forces, as well as the Red Army, that is responsible for Anglo-American objections and the resulting problems of military government in Austria.

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The efforts of Marshal Tito, whose government has a pact with Russia, to establish military and political control over the Austrian city of Klagenfurt and the province of Carinthia, as well as Trieste and Venezia Giulia are also creating numerous difficulties for the United States and British occupation forces. In Trieste these problems are particularly acute, for AMG officers have been unable to establish headquarters in the city because of the presence of Partisan troops—estimated on May 20 to number 70,000. One result of this situation is that Trieste is not receiving its usual bread supply, for the flour mills west of the city are under Allied rather than Yugoslav control, and hunger will soon be added to the explosive factors already created by the presence of rival armed forces.

RUSSIAN BLOC SOLIDIFYING. But it is chiefly because Marshal Tito's actions are regarded in Washington and London as an apparent indication of Russia's intentions to tighten up its eastern European bloc before the continent is stabilized on the basis of agreements among the Big Three that acting Secretary of State Grew and Marshal Alexander have sent carefully considered protests to Belgrade. For it appears that, with Trieste in Tito's hands, the Russian group of states would have direct access to the most important Adriatic port and thus possess its own trade outlet. And Austrian Carinthia may be of equal importance in strengthening the bonds among the eastern European states, for this region may form part of a new corridor between Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, two of the leading Slavic states linked to Russia by bilateral treaties.

That the new Russian-sponsored confederation in eastern Europe may provide a better framework for solution of the problems of this region of overpopulated rural areas and few industrial opportunities than did the Versailles system of independent states

does not seem to be seriously disputed by Britain or the United States. Neither are the Western Allies challenging Russian statements that this bloc is being formed as protection against a resurgent Germany, although *Pravda* declared on May 13 that "Russia is sure that the victory puts an end to the German menace for many generations to come." Nevertheless, the United States and Britain are anxious to learn how far west Russia intends to extend its security zone and what methods it will use in consolidating that area.

Since British parliamentary elections are scheduled for July, it has been suggested that Prime Minister Churchill summed up his foreign policy in his victory declaration speech of May 13 in terms that particularly emphasize Britain's traditional opposition to control of Europe by any single continental power. But Churchill's statement of policy can hardly be dismissed as campaign propaganda. For if the present British cabinet were defining its foreign policy with an eye on the polls, it would presumably make every effort to avoid criticizing Russia, even by implication, since it is on the Left that the Conservatives need to court votes. A more plausible, and more disturbing interpretation of the stand Britain is taking, with the support of the United States, on such problems as those of Austria and Trieste, is that all three major victors are attempting to delimit strategic zones on the continent as a possible alternative and parallel to the world security organization being formed at San Francisco. Because of the obvious dangers in this contest for positions in Europe, it is imperative that the struggle be halted before further damage is done to the inter-Allied harmony on which success of the new League depends. The speedy convening of a Big Three meeting would be an important step in this direction.

WINIFRED N. HADSEL

NATIONAL vs. COLLECTIVE SECURITY KEY ISSUE AT SAN FRANCISCO

SAN FRANCISCO.—As the San Francisco Conference enters its fourth week it becomes increasingly apparent that the abrupt termination of the war in Europe has greatly increased the problems faced by the conferees. At the same time it has made the creation of machinery to deal with these problems more urgent than ever. Great as has been the effort to concentrate on machinery-building and to avoid discussion of specific political and economic issues, these issues—Russia's intentions in Europe and Asia, the treatment of Germany, the disposition to be made of territories taken from enemy states, the future of colonies—have dominated the thoughts of all delegates both in committee meetings, closed to the press, and in private conversations.

TWO SETS OF NEGOTIATIONS. This Conference has laid bare the quivering, aching nerves of

nations that have carried the burden of the war, and now face with anxiety the burdens of peacemaking. The constant appraisal of future prospects in Europe and Asia that goes on behind closed doors is in a sense beneficial, for it lends reality to discussions about procedures and technical details which would otherwise seem troublingly abstract. But it also means that each country, in reaching decisions about this or that provision of the Charter, makes mental calculations as to the way in which it may be applied at coming peace conferences. Thus actually two sets of negotiations are proceeding side by side—the publicized work of the UNCIO's commissions and committees, and the relatively unpublicized efforts of the various nations to adopt positions most favorable to their interests in the troubled days ahead.

These parallel negotiations are most clearly seen

in the heated debates aroused by two questions which had not been sufficiently considered at Dumbarton Oaks, and therefore made a belated appearance on the agenda: the relationship of regional to collective security, and arrangements for international trusteeship. In both instances it is clear that all nations are haunted by the fear that international organization may not afford them adequate security against aggression, and are loath to give up such security measures as they have already adopted, or such assets of power as they already possess until the efficacy of the international organization has been demonstrated by experience.

A compromise formula on regional arrangements was reached on May 20, which assures every regional group an opportunity to take measures of self-defense if an attack against one of its members occurs before the Security Council has taken the "necessary" measures to deal with the aggressor. This agreement has the advantage of avoiding specific references to the Act of Chapultepec, and of asserting the thesis, vigorously supported by the United States delegation, that the international organization must take precedence over regional security arrangements.

TRUSTEESHIP AND STRATEGIC BASES. The trusteeship issue, which was only raised on the eve of the Conference, with the result that many delegations had not been adequately prepared to consider it, has also revealed the struggle that is being waged between national and international security concepts. The proposal originally made by the United States for a distinction between strategic and non-strategic areas has not seemed practical to many delegations. And an attempt has been made to reconcile the views of this country—which, with the Japanese islands in mind, stressed the strategic aspects of territories taken from enemy states—with those of Britain, which declared that its policy toward colonies had always been that of a trustee, and emphasized its concern for the welfare of the inhabitants of dependent areas.

The working paper submitted by Commander

Stassen on May 16 represented a compromise between the various views expressed on the subject. The most important points in this paper are that nations which receive territories taken from enemy states at future peace conferences will apparently be free to decide whether they will place these territories under the international system of trusteeship; that it will be the duty of the state administering the trust territory "to insure that the territory shall play its part in the maintenance of international peace and security"—thus permitting its fortification and use as a strategic base, which was not the case under the League of Nations mandates system and that the United Nations concerned should develop "self-government in forms appropriate to the varying circumstances of each territory"—without mention of eventual independence. (The British have contended that independence, urged by Russia and China, does not necessarily insure either self-government or security, and on May 17 announced the grant of self-government to Burma as an example of the policies they plan to follow in the colonies regained from Japan.) Should the proposals drafted by Commander Stassen be adopted, the trusteeship system may prove less adequate than the League mandates system which made it obligatory for the victors in World War I to place the mandates assigned to them under the aegis of the League of Nations.

In weighing the achievements of the Conference, it must be constantly borne in mind that the emphasis here is not on ideal solutions which might not prove feasible in practice, but on hard-headed, practical measures to achieve security. Much as the small countries would prefer an international organization in which they could play a more decisive part, many of them have come to the conclusion that their best hope of security depends on continued cooperation between the United States, Britain and Russia. That is why, for the time being, they are less concerned with what happens at San Francisco than with the outcome of the proposed Big Three meeting.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

MIDDLE WEST FOCUSES ATTENTION ON RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA

BY BLAIR BOLLES

[The following article was written by Mr. Bolles en route to San Francisco, to attend the United Nations Conference on International Organization as an accredited press representative of the Foreign Policy Association.]

DENVER.—The Middle Westerner today asks only one question about foreign affairs—what are Russia's intentions? In a five-day trip the question has been asked again and again, in St. Louis, Minneapolis, St. Paul, Omaha and Denver. It comes from the conductor on the trains, from the casual eating com-

panion in the diner, from the businessman and lawyer, the working man and the girl behind the cigar counter.

HOPE FOR GOOD RELATIONS. The question is put earnestly, not captiously. The war has so modified isolationism in the Mississippi and Missouri Valleys that only a few Congressmen last fall dared campaign on platforms urging American withdrawal from world affairs. Most of the men and women in the central part of the United States, furthermore, are trying to steel themselves against disillusion in foreign affairs. Newspapers like the *St. Louis Post*-

Dispatch, St. Paul Pioneer Press and Minneapolis Star-Journal have succeeded in their constant effort to stress, first, the need for a continuing United States role as a politically active world power and, second, the slowness and irregularity which must mark the progress of the United States or any other state toward its goals in foreign relations. The *St. Paul Dispatch* scored a point against disillusion in an editorial on May 14 by urging that we "learn to disagree" with Russia.

In the Middle West bewilderment has replaced isolationism and disillusion. The same editorial writer who, in print, tells his readers that the future of peace depends on the nature of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, discloses privately his own inability to understand why the Russians failed to compose the differences with this country and Britain over the nature of the Polish government, why the 16 Poles from the underground were arrested, why the Soviets acted alone in encouraging the establishment of a government in Austria. The compromises which Russia has accepted at the United Nations Conference in San Francisco fail to erase the puzzled concern over these issues.

This concern about the Soviet Union reflects the vitality of the idealism inherent in the American approach to international relations, for at no point has Russian policy in Europe touched directly our vital interest. It reflects, at the same time, a lack of understanding of conditions before the war in most of the southeastern European countries where Soviet influence today is most apparent. The idealists wish that in Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Rumania the populations themselves might make a sovereign choice of their governments through independent ballot. It is forgotten that before the war dictatorial political influences controlled those three countries in the interest of minor fractions of the whole populations, and that most of the men and women in those coun-

tries lack the experience necessary for the conduct of political democracy as we know it. However firm-handed the régimes in those countries may be today, they employ a revolutionary tactic that is part of an effort to establish a political system beneficial to the masses rather than the privileged.

DANGER OF INADEQUATE INFORMATION. Yet the Russians will continue to arouse suspicious bewilderment in this part of the United States so long as they bar Allied newspapermen from the areas of greatest Soviet influence. A lawyer in St. Paul wondered if this news policy reflected a sense of doubt in the Russian official mind about Russia's own strength, but the average observer rather tends to see something sinister in the restrictions on access to information. The United States government may have fed the growing doubt about the sincerity of Russia's intentions to cooperate fully and freely with other states after the war by its blunt reaction to the arrest of the 16 Poles and to the creation of the Austrian government. It is seldom suggested that the Poles might in fact be dangerously unfriendly to Russia or that the political situation in Austria might have required the immediate creation of a government. The great interest in the Middle West in the Russian question is born of real hope for a lasting, cooperative peace. Yet while public opinion earnestly examines the development of broader Russian policies, attention is also riveted on Germany. Whether the United States, Britain and Russia can successfully cooperate in the difficult task of occupying that defeated country remains as the crucial test of Allied unity, so necessary for cooperation in the years ahead.

THE F.P.A. BOOKSHELF

Bases Overseas, by George Weller. New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1944. \$8.50

The *Chicago Daily News* foreign correspondent outlines the history of our foreign policy and charts its future by centering attention on the necessity of American acquisition of bases abroad. The argument is forceful, but little attention is given to the possibility of either internationalizing bases or organizing world security within the framework of a United Nations organization.

Full Employment in a Free Society, by William H. Beveridge. New York, W. W. Norton, 1945. \$3.75

The author of the famed *Beveridge Report on the Social Services in Britain* expounds the economic principles of full employment in the present volume. Following closely the Keynesian analysis of the cause of unemployment, his proposals make possible the retention of private enterprise while offering no block to the socialization of industry where necessary. The three-fold aim of Beveridge's plan is to maintain total capital expenditure, control the location of industry, and secure the organized mobility of labor.

For an example of the unsettled state of colonial questions and a survey of the United States attitude toward one section of the Far East, READ—

FRANCE AND THE FUTURE OF INDO-CHINA

by Lawrence K. Rosinger

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